Navigating The Debt-Equity Decisions Of Financial Services Firms: Some Evidence From South Africa by Moyo, Vusani
The Journal of Applied Business Research – March/April 2016 Volume 32, Number 2 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 417 The Clute Institute 
Navigating The Debt-Equity 
Decisions Of Financial Services Firms: 
Some Evidence From South Africa 
Vusani Moyo, University of Venda, South Africa 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Empirical studies on the impact of regulation on the financial policies of banks have documented that unconstrained 
forward-looking banks with sufficient franchise value build and actively maintain capital buffers. This financing 
behaviour thus relegates the regulatory intervention to non-binding and of secondary importance. This study used a 
sample of 29 financial services firms listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) during the period 2003 to 
2012 to test for the validity of the market timing, pecking order and the dynamic trade-off theories in explaining the 
financing behaviour of financial services firms. Consistent with the dynamic trade-off theory and contrary to the 
market timing and pecking order theories, the study documents that, leverage is positively correlated to firm 
profitability, size and asset tangibility. The firms’ true speed of adjustment is 56.80% for the market-to-debt ratio 
(MDR) and 71.31% for the book-to-debt ratio (BDR). The modified external finance-weighted average market-to-
book has an insignificant positive and negative correlation with the MDR and the BDR respectively. Taken together, 
the JSE-listed financial services firms have target optimal capital structures which they actively adjust towards. 
Their security issuance decisions are not driven by the stock market performance, share returns or the time-varying 
adverse selection costs.  
 
Keywords: Capital Structure; Trade-Off Theory; Pecking Order Theory; Speed of Adjustment; Random Effects 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
mpirical research on capital structure has always avoided using data from regulated financial services 
firms such as banks, building societies, insurance firms, medical aid schemes and investment firms in 
testing the validity of the leading capital structure theories. The main reason that is always cited is that 
these firms are regulated and have therefore different financial policies from the non-financial firms which are 
unregulated. The argument is that the regulatory framework imposes minimum capital requirements which has to be 
complied with if the firm is to continue operating. This argument implies that the financial policies of financial 
services firms are strictly dictated to by the existing regulatory regime and management have limited or no 
discretionary powers on the financial policies of their firms. This assertion, however, contradicts both the buffer 
capital theory of Marcus (1984) and Milne and Whalley (2001) and the theory of optimal bank capital structure of 
Flannery (1994), Myers and Rajan (1998), Diamond and Rajan (2000) and Allen, Carletti, and Marquez (2011) in 
the case of banks. 
 
 The buffer capital theory states that banks with low capital buffers strive rebuild an appropriate capital buffer whilst 
those with high capital buffers attempt to maintain them. The theory asserts that progressive banks with sufficient 
franchise value build and maintain a buffer of capital in excess of the regulatory minimum (Milne & Whalley, 
2001). The buffer capital is defined as the excess capital that a bank holds above the regulatory minimum and this 
results from the bank’s discretionary financial policy (Lindquist, 2004). In the traditional capital structure theories, 
the buffer capital concept is equivalent to the firm’s financial slack/flexibility as defined by the pecking order theory 
of Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984). Shivdasani and Zenner (2005) contend that firms place premium 
value on creating and maintaining financial flexibility as they view it as a real option to the firm.  
 
E 
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The theory of optimal bank capital structure asserts that the bank’s optimal financial policy involves setting an 
optimal capital ratio which is the sum of the regulatory minimum and a capital cushion. This optimal capital ratio, 
which is a function of bank size, sanction costs, current capital ratio volatility, liquidity premium, operating costs 
variance, credit and liquidity risks, cash flow volatility and bank franchise value, maximises the value of the banking 
firm (Barrios & Blanco, 2003:1955; Milne & Whalley, 2001).  
 
According to Berger, De Young, Flannery, Lee and Oztekin (2008), banks have capital ratios that are substantially 
above the regulatory minima; they actively manage their capital ratios and the negative target deviation spread is 
eliminated fairly quickly implying a relatively high speed of adjustment (SOA) towards the optimal capital structure. 
A number of studies including those of Barrios and Blanco (2003), Heid, Porath and Stolz (2004), Lindquist (2004), 
Octavia and Brown (2008), Rime (2001) and Shrieves and Dahl (1992) validate the buffer capital and optimal bank 
capital structure theories.  
 
The capital adequacy ratios reported by the three major South African banks for the year ended 2013 also validate 
the buffer capital theory. For example, for the year ended 2013, the First Rand group’s Common Equity Tier 1 (CET 
1), Tier 1 and Total Capital adequacy ratios were 13.8%, 14.8% and 16.3% respectively (First Rand Group, 2013). 
The Nedbank group’s capital adequacy ratios were 12.5%, 13.6% and 15.7% (Nedbank Group, 2013) while the 
Standard Bank group had capital adequacy ratios of 12.6%, 13.2% and 16.2% (Standard Bank Group, 2013). In all 
cases, all the three capital adequacy ratios were well-above the SARB’s minimum regulatory requirements of 4.5% 
for CET 1, 6.0% for Tier 1 and 9.5% for the Total Capital adequacy ratio.    
 
What informs the buffer capital policy? There are a number of reasons why the observed bank financing behaviour 
validates the buffer capital theory. Furfine (2001), Lindquist (2004:494) and Milne and Whalley (2001) argued that 
buffer capital ensures that the bank avoids costs related to market discipline and supervisory intervention that result 
from the infringements of minimum capital regulatory requirements. The cushion or excess capital reduces the 
probability that shocks may cause the capital ratio to fall below the regulatory minimum (Barrios & Blanco, 2003). 
It serves as insurance against failure to meet minimum regulatory capital requirements (Heid et al, 2004).  
According to Rime (2001), the buffer capital eases the bank’s regulatory pressure and reduces its risk. The banks 
also hold excess capital so that they are able to exploit unexpected investment opportunities (Berger, Herring & 
Szgo, 1995).   
 
The capital structure buffer and the optimal bank capital structure theories have a number of implications for the 
regulated financial firms. Firstly, these firms, like some of their unregulated non-financial counterparts, value 
financial flexibility. Secondly, the firms have an optimal capital structure where firm value is maximised. Thirdly, 
even though the firm’s capital structures are regulated, they exercise their own discretion in their financial policies. 
This means that regulated firms relegate the regulatory requirements to non-binding and of second order importance. 
They design their own capital structures which maximise their firm values. This financing behaviour therefore 
invalidates the regulatory minimum capital theory that banks hold minimum capital to satisfy regulatory 
requirements. Fourthly, the firms are expected to actively rebalance their capital structures towards the optimal 
capital structure and this implies a positive SOA towards the target optimal capital structure. Owing to the costs of 
market discipline, the SOA towards the target optimal capital structure is expected to be higher than that of the 
unregulated non-financial firms. These implications raise the following questions about the financing behaviour of 
regulated firms: how do these firms choose their optimal debt to equity ratios? Can their financing behaviours be 
explained by the existing capital structure theories? How fast do these firms adjust their capital structures towards 
the optimal debt ratio?  
 
A limited number of studies have attempted to explain the capital structures of banks using the trade-off and pecking 
order theories. The main studies include those of Amidu (2007), De Wet (2014), Gropp and Heider (2010), Lim 
(2012) and Octavia and Brown (2008). These studies have however been limited to banking firms thus excluding 
other regulated financial firms. They also exclude the test for the validity of the market timing in regulated financial 
services firms. Furthermore, these studies only used the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) and fixed effects 
estimators.  They shunned the modern and least biased econometric panel data estimators such as the Anderson-
Hsiao (1981) instrumental variables, the difference generalised method of moments (GMM) of Arellano and Bond 
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(1991), the system GMM of Blundell and Bond (1998), the random effect Tobit and the bias-corrected least squares 
dummy variable (LSDV) proposed by Bruno (2005).     
 
The current study was aimed at addressing the short comings of the earlier studies on the determinants of the capital 
structure of financial services firms. Using a panel data set obtained from a sample of 29 financial services firms 
listed on the JSE during the period 2003 to 2012, the study tested for the validity of the market timing, pecking order 
and the dynamic trade-off theories in explaining the observed capital structures of financial services firms. The 
financial services firms sampled included banks, insurance, and investment and fund management firms. The study 
used the random effects Tobit estimator to fit the partial adjustment models.  The study was also aimed at addressing 
the short comings of the earlier studies on bank capital structure. 
 
As a preview of the results, the study found that the modified Bruinshoofd and De Haan (2012) market timing 
measure is positively correlated to the MDR ratio. The measure is however negatively correlated to the BDR ratio. 
The correlations are insignificant in all cases. Firm profitability, size, tangibility and growth rate all positively 
correlated to both the MDR and the BDR. The firms have a positive and significant SOA towards the optimal capital 
structure. The true SOA for the sample is 56.80% (half-life of 0.83 years) for the MDR and 71.31% (half-life of 0.56 
years) for the BDR. The market timing measure has an insignificant effect in the MDR regression model but it 
increases the SOA towards the target leverage in the BDR regression model. 
 
Except for the correlation between leverage and firm growth, these results are consistent with the dynamic trade-off 
hypothesis. They also validate the buffer capital and optimal bank capital structure hypotheses. The results however 
reject the market timing and pecking order theories. This means that the JSE-listed financial services firms have 
target optimal capital structures which they actively adjusts towards.  
 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a review of the related literature and provides a basis 
for hypothesis development. Section 3 contains the data sources and methodology used. Section 4 discusses the 
results of the study, and Section 5 concludes the study.   
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
According to Flannery and Rangan (2006) and Huang and Ritter (2009), the three leading theories that explain the 
observed corporate financing behaviour are the trade-off, pecking order, and market timing models. The trade-off 
theory asserts that firms have an optimal debt ratio where firm value is maximised. The optimal capital structure 
occurs at a point where marginal benefits of debt interest tax shields are equal to the marginal agency and financial 
distress costs (Modigliani & Miller, 1963). The trade-off theory implies that the firms’ financing decisions and 
hence the security issuance decisions are largely driven by the need to maintain an optimal capital structure. Byoun 
(2008) and Kayhan and Titman (2007) conceded that financing decisions are aimed at moving the firms towards 
their optimal capital structures. In practice however, it is observed that firms do deviate from their optimal capital 
structures but, regardless of the presence of adjustment costs, they actively rebalance their capital structures (Leary 
& Roberts, 2005). This financing behaviour is consistent with the predictions of the dynamic trade-off theory of 
Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989), Goldstein, Ju and Leland (2001) and Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2002). 
The rate at which the firm rebalances its capital structure defines its target SOA. According to Drobetz and 
Wanzernried (2006) and Hovakimian and Li (2011), the target SOA is affected by the firm-specific factors, the 
magnitude of the target deviation spread and the wider macroeconomic factors. Elsas and Florysiak (2011) 
documented heterogeneity across firms in the SOA towards the optimal capital structure. Moyo, Wolmarans & 
Brümmer (2013) and Ramjee and Gwatidzo (2012) found that non-financial firms listed on the JSE have a positive 
SOA in the range of 42.44% to 65.00% on the MDR ratio and 57.64%to 74.44% on the BDR ratio. Thus according 
to the dynamic trade-off theory, firms have optimal leverage ratios which they actively rebalance towards at various 
speeds. The firms partially eliminate the target deviation spread and have a positive SOA towards the optimal capital 
structure.  
 
The pecking order theory of Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984), which is based information asymmetry, 
rejects the idea of an optimal capital structure. The theory states that firms minimise their time-varying adverse 
selection costs by relying more on internal finance. If faced with an internal funds deficit, the firm follows a pecking 
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order in raising external finance. This means that low risk debt being the first choice, then hybrid instruments and 
lastly equity (Barclay & Smith, 2005; Tong & Green, 2005). The pecking order minimises the firm’s financing and 
information asymmetry costs thus maximising its value. The implication of the pecking order theory is that the 
observed debt ratios reflect the firm’s cumulative requirement for external financing (Myers, 2008: 235). This 
contradicts the dynamic trade-off theory which states that observed leverage ratios reflects the firms attempt to move 
towards the optimal capital structure.  
 
A number of studies including those of Elsas and Florysiak, 2011, Hovakimian and Li (2011), Huang and Ritter 
(2009), Leary and Roberts (2005) and Ramjee and Gwatidzo (2012) found that firms actively rebalance their capital 
structures towards the optimal capital structure thus validating the dynamic trade-off theory. The findings of Graham 
(2000), Lemmon and Zender (2010), Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), Titman and Wessels (1988) and Tong and 
Green (2005) support the pecking order theory. Some studies including those of Barclays and Smith (2005:9), Moyo 
et al (2013) and Mukherjee and Mahakud (2012), however, found   the two theories to be complimentary in 
explaining the observed capital structures.   
 
The market timing theory of Baker and Wurgler (2002), Korajczyk, Lucas and McDonald (1992) and Lucas and 
McDonald (1990) posits that managers time the equity market in making their security issuance decisions. Like the 
pecking order theory, the market timing theory is based on the existence of information asymmetry between 
managers and investors. The firm’s decision to issue equity depends on the stock market performance and the 
current valuation of its shares. Firms only issue shares when they believe that the firm’s shares are currently 
overvalued, otherwise they issue debt (Barclay & Smith, 2005). Debt issuances signal that the firm’s shares are 
undervalued (Spiess & Affleck-Graves, 1999). According to Lucas and McDonald (1990), equity issuances are 
preceded by on average an abnormal positive share return and an abnormal rise in the market. According to Baker 
and Wurgler (2002), the effect of market timing is persistent, lasting more than 10 years. The marketing theory 
means that observed leverage ratios are reflected cumulative attempts by managers to time the equity market. The 
market timing theory rejects the idea of an optimal capital structure or the existence of a target optimal capital 
structure.  According to the theory, firms do not rebalance their capital structures and hence the target SOA is zero. 
The sole determinant of corporate financing decision is over/undervaluation of securities. Interest tax shields, non-
debt tax shield, agency and the time-varying adverse selection costs play no role in the security issuance decisions.    
 
The support for the market timing theory is however mixed. Bongerdef and Chichti (2010), Burch, Christie and 
Nanda (2004), Elliott, Koeter-Kent and Warr (2008), Graham and Harvey (2001) and Jenter (2005) found that equity 
overvaluation drives equity issuance decisions and this validates the market timing theory.   The findings of Alti 
(2006), Baxamusa (2011), Bruinshoofd and De Haan (2012), De Bie and De Haan (2007), Frank and Goyal (2004), 
Mahajan and Tartaroghi (2008) and Walker and Yost (2008),  on the non-persistence of market timing effects  
however invalidates the market timing theory in,  favour of the dynamic trade-off and pecking order theories. Both 
the dynamic trade-off and pecking order theories contend that the pricing of securities (over/undervaluation) and the 
performance of the stock market plays no role in the security-type issuance decisions if firms.  
 
2.1 The Market Timing Measures 
 
The study used the modified Bruinshoofd and De Haan’s (2012) External Finance-Weighted Average Market-to-
Book (𝐸𝐹𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵'() ) market timing measure. The model only uses long-term debt as it accurately captures market 
timing of issuance decisions. Furthermore, this measure allows for direct interpretation of the regression results. The 
measure is defined as:  
 𝐸𝐹𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵'() = +,( -./0'1.-2/0'12345265'7+89+ ×𝑀𝐵8	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   (1) 
 
Where 𝑀𝐵 is the average level of market-to-book ratio over each firm’s entre sample period, 2003 to 2012; 𝑒  and 𝑙𝑡𝑑 denote net equity and total long-term debt issuances respectively; 𝑀𝑇𝐵 is the market-to-book ratio, suffices 𝑠  
represents a specific year issuances and suffice 𝑟 represents issuances for the total period. Baker and Wurgler (2002) 
define equity issuances as a change (increase) in the book value of share capital and debt issuances as a change 
(increase) in the book value of debt. -./0'1.-2/0'12345265  is the ratio of current period external finance to the total external 
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finance over the study period which in this study is the years 2000 to 2012.  The measure implies that firms that time 
the market tend to have a high  𝐸𝐹𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵'() since they issue more equity and  less long-term debt when the 𝑀𝑇𝐵 is 
high. The study also used the Baker and Wurgler’s (2002) market timing measure to test for robustness of the 
results. The measure is defined as follows:  
 𝐸𝐹𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵'(C = -./1.-2/12345265'7+89+ ×𝑀𝐵8	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   (2) 
 
Where 𝑑 denotes total debt issuances.  
 
2.2 Firm-Specific Determinants of Leverage  
 
Following Baker and Wurgler (2002),Bruinshoofd and De Haan (2012), De Bie and De Haan (2007) and Mahajan 
and Tartaroghi (2008), the study’s regression model also included a set of firm-specific determinants of leverage. 
These factors control for firm-specific effects and were also used to test for the mutual-exclusiveness of the dynamic 
trade-off, pecking order and market timing theories. These factors are part of the Frank and Goyal’s (2009) core 
leverage model and are profitability, firm size, un-weighted market-to-book ratio and asset tangibility. From the 
stylised facts of Bessler, Drobetz and Kazemieh (2011), large firms and firms with considerable tangible assets tend 
to have high leverage. On the other hand, profitable firms and those that have high growth opportunities tend to have 
low leverage.  
 
Firms with high growth rates tend to be young, less profitable and hence face lower tax bills (Dang, Kim & Shin, 
2012). The firms’ high capital expenditures increases their non-debt tax shields in the form of capital allowances. 
The increased non-debt tax substitutes the benefit from debt interest as the two are perfect substitutes (De Angelo & 
Masulis, 1980). Growth firms are therefore likely to suffer from increased financial distress and underinvestment 
costs (Myers, 1977). According to the trade-off theory, these costs can be reduced by using more equity than debt 
and hence a negative correlation between leverage and firm growth rate (Bessler, et al, 2011). By contrary, low 
growth firm tend to be large, mature, and highly profitable. They face increased tax bills which derive from their 
high profitability and low capital expenditures. The low growth firms are also likely to suffer from the agency costs 
of overinvestment which result from increased free cash flow (Jensen & Meckling 1976). These costs can be 
reduced by using more debt. The study used 𝑀𝑇𝐵 ratio as a proxy for firm growth rate.   
 
Asset tangibility is a direct measure of the collateral that the firm can offer to lenders (Bessler et al, 2011). Firms 
with high collateral assets face reduced bankruptcy costs which in turn increases the net benefits of debt to the firm. 
Furthermore, the increased collateral reduces the firms’ borrowing costs while increasing their debt capacities. This 
makes borrowing more attractive to the firms and hence high leverage. Campello and Giambona (2013) found that 
asset tangibility and redeployability are the main drivers of corporate debt policy. The positive correlation between 
leverage and asset tangibility is consistent with the prediction of trade-off theory. Asset tangibility was measured as 
fixed assets scaled up with total assets.   
 
Large firms tend to be mature, have stable earnings, less risky and have high stocks of tangible assets (Barclay & 
Smith, 2005). These features increase their credit ratings thus making debt a cheaper and more attractive source of 
finance for them (Kisgen, 2007). Leverage is therefore negatively correlated to firm size and this validates the trade-
off theory. Firm size was measured as the natural logarithm of total assets.   
 
According to the pecking order theory, profitable firms with sticky dividend policies face lower or no internal funds 
deficiency and hence will require less external finance which is raised in pecking order with debt being the first 
option (Myers, 2008). This financing behaviour implies that highly profitable firms use less debt finance. The 
negative correlation between profitability and leverage is consistent with the predictions of the pecking order theory. 
According to Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) this negative correlation presents “the most telling 
evidence against the trade-off theory”. In this study, profitability was measured by the ratio of earnings before 
interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) to total assets.     
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The inclusion of 𝑀𝑇𝐵 variable in the regression model was to also control for the cross-sectional variation in the 
level of market-to-book and this leaves only the residual  influence of past, within-firm variation in the market-to-
book ratio for the 𝐸𝐹𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵'(C.  The study uses two measures of leverage: the MDR and the BDR. MDR is defined 
as the total interest-bearing debt (short-term and long-term) scaled up by the sum of the total debt and the firm 
market capitalisation. BDR is defined as the total interest-bearing debt (short-term and long-term) scaled up by the 
total assets.  
 
2.3 Hypotheses 
 
The hypotheses developed above can be summarised as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Market Timing Behaviour 
 
Firms time the market in their debt-equity issuance decisions and do not consecutively rebalance their capital 
structures. Thus there is a significant negative correlation between leverage and the 𝐸𝐹𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵'(C. A significant 
negative correlation between leverage and 𝐸𝐹𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵 confirms that validity of the market timing theory whilst a 
positive correlation or insignificant negative correlation validates the static trade-off theory.   
 
Hypothesis 2: Firm-specific Determinants of Leverage 
 
Hypothesis 2.1: Leverage is negatively correlated to firm growth rate  
 
Hypothesis 2.2: Leverage is negatively correlated to firm profitability  
 
Hypothesis 2.1: Leverage is positively correlated to asset tangibility  
 
Hypothesis 2.1: Leverage is positively correlated to firm size.  
 
Hypothesis3: SOA towards Target Leverage 
 
The market timing theory hypothesizes that firms do not have target leverage ratios and hence will have zero SOA.  
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The data for the study was drawn from a sample of 29 JSE-listed financial services firms with complete data for 
eight or more consecutive years during the period 2003 to 2012. The financial services firms listed on the JSE 
during this period included banks, investment firms and insurance firms. An unbalanced panel was constructed from 
data drawn from the McGreGorBFA’s standardised annual financial statements of these firms.  The total number of 
observations for the period was 290.   
 
3.1 Regression Model  
 
This study follows the methodology used by Moyo (2014). Following Baker and Wurgler (2002), Bruinshoofd and 
De Haan (2012) and Mahajan and Tartaroglu (2008), the basic regression model was specified as:  
 𝐿𝑒𝑣F,'/+ = 𝛾+𝐸𝐹𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵'(C + 𝛾J K(LM)NMN ' + 𝛾O𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝐴)' + 𝛾S TNMN ' + 𝛽V𝑀𝑇𝐵' + 𝑐F +𝜀F,'/+	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   (3) 
 
Where:𝐿𝑒𝑣F,'/+ is the firm’s debt ratio measured by either the BDR or the MDR at  𝑖, 𝑡 + 1; 𝑖 denotes a particular 
firm; 𝑡 is the current year; 𝑡 + 1 is the next year;𝛾+, 𝛾J, 𝛾O, 𝛾S	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝛾V are coefficient vectors;𝑐F denotes the firm fixed 
effect and 𝜀F,'/+ is an error term.In this study,𝐸𝐹𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵'(C was substituted by 𝐸𝐹𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵'() and the resulting model 
was specified as:  
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𝐿𝑒𝑣F,'/+ = 𝛾+𝑿' + 𝛾J𝐸𝐹𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵'() + 𝑐F + 𝜀F,'/+	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   (4) 
 
Where 𝑿F,' is a vector of the firm-specific variables contained in model 1.  
 
According to the dynamic trade-off theory, firms have target debt ratios towards which they actively adjust at a 
given speed. The active adjustment towards a target debt ratio assumes a perfect capital market, which implies that 
firms will frequently and fully adjust to their chosen target ratios. However, in practice, firms face information 
asymmetries, transaction costs and adjustment costs, and this implies that they will infrequently and partially adjust 
their capital structures towards their predetermined leverage ratios. A firm’s target leverage, 𝐿𝑒𝑣F,'/+∗ ,  is given by:  
 𝐿𝑒𝑣F,'/+∗ = 𝑿F,'𝛾	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   (5) 
 
Where 𝛾 is a coefficient vector.  
 
The firm’s leverage partial adjustment model is specified as:  
 𝐿𝑒𝑣F,'/+ − 𝐿𝑒𝑣F,' = 𝐿𝑒𝑣F,'/+∗ − 𝐿𝑒𝑣F,' + 𝜀F,'/+	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   (6) 
 
Substituting (5) into (6) and simplifying the equation yields a partial adjustment model that can be used to estimate 
the firm’s SOA towards the target leverage that is:  
 𝐿𝑒𝑣F,'/+ = 1 − 𝜆 𝐿𝑒𝑣F,' + 𝜆 𝑿F,'𝛾 + 𝑐F + 𝜀F,'/+	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   (7) 
 
Where 𝜆 denotes the SOA towards the target leverage and 𝑐F is the time-invariant unobserved variable (firm-fixed 
effect). 
 
For the dynamic trade-off theory hypothesis to hold, some of the elements of the coefficient vector must be different 
from zero that is 𝛾 ≠ 0. In cases where 𝜆 = 0,it means that the SOA is zero implying that firms have no target 
leverage ratios. If 𝜆 = 1, it means that the firm immediately adjusts towards its target debt ratio. It is also possible to 
get negative values of 𝜆. The negative SOA means that the firm over-adjusts its leverage.    
 
The partial adjustment model can be extended to include the market timing measure. The extended partial 
adjustment model is therefore:  
 𝐿𝑒𝑣F,'/+ = 1 − 𝜆 𝐿𝑒𝑣F,' + 𝜆 𝑿F,'𝛾+ + 𝜆𝛾J𝐸𝐹𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵'() + 𝑐F + 𝜀F,'/+	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   (8) 
 
This is the basic regression model and is labelled regression model 1. The alternative partial adjustment model only 
uses the firm-specific variables with no market timing measures. This is expressed as:  
 𝐿𝑒𝑣F,'/+ = 1 − 𝜆 𝐿𝑒𝑣F,' + 𝜆 𝑿F,'𝛾 + 𝑐F + 𝜀F,'/+	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   (9) 
 
This is regression model 2.  
 
The study used regression model 1 to test for the validity of the market timing and dynamic trade-off theories and to 
estimate the SOA towards the target leverage. Regression model 2 was used to test what impact excluding the 
market timing measure has on the firm’s SOA towards the target leverage. The random effects Tobit maximum 
likelihood estimator was used to fit both regression models. This estimator is an equivalent of the double-censored 
dynamic panel data with a fractional dependent variable (DPF) estimator proposed by Elsas and Florysiak (2011) 
and Elsas and Florysiak (2013). Unlike the much recommended Blundell and Bond (1998) system generalised 
method of moments (GMM), the bias-corrected least squares dummy variable (LSDVC) and the long difference 
estimators, the random effects Tobit/DPF maximum likelihood estimator is unbiased, is consistent in the context of 
unbalanced dynamic panel data with a fractional dependent variable, and also accounts for firm-fixed effects. 
Leverage ratios are fractional in nature; they occur between 0 and 1. This makes the random effects Tobit maximum 
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likelihood estimator the most suitable estimator for use in this study. The estimator was implemented in Stata using 
the xttobit command with censors specified as 0 (minimum) and 1 (maximum).  
 
4. RESULTS 
 
The test results consist of summary statistics and empirical results.  
 
4.1 Summary Statistics 
 
The summary statistics of the sample are presented in Table 1 below.  
 
Table 1.  Summary Statistics 2000-2012 
Variable No. Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis 
MDR 261 0.3784 0.2373 0.3582 0.0000 1.0000 0.4278 1.5309 
BDR 261 0.3193 0.1597 0.3314 0.0000 1.0000 0.5673 1.6935 
Profitability 290 0.0836 0.0648 0.0718 0.0024 0.2229 0.6631 2.2715 
Size  290 16.1284 16.2821 3.1214 11.0970 20.2769 -0.1651 1.7625 
Tangibility  290 0.0347 0.0174 0.0375 0.0033 0.1220 1.3940 3.6242 
MTB  290 0.6395 0.4233 0.5273 0.1226 1.6907 0.2781 2.4378 𝑬𝑭𝑾𝑨𝑴𝑩𝒕𝑩𝑾 290 0.0436 0.0068 0.0673 0.0000 0.2034 1.5279 3.8998 𝑬𝑬𝑾𝑨𝑴𝑩𝒕 280 0.0533 0.0010 0.0807 0.0000 0.2311 1.3085 3.1605 𝑫𝑾𝑨𝑴𝑩𝒕 290 0.1050 0.0013 0.1827 0.0000 0.5510 1.7134 4.3817 𝑬𝑭𝑾𝑨𝑴𝑩𝒕𝑩𝑫 289 0.0665 0.0155 0.0948 0.0000 0.2863 1.3832 3.5435 
 
The sample consists of 29 JSE-Listed financial services firms with complete data for eight or more consecutive 
years during 2000 to 2012. The unbalanced panel was constructed from data drawn from standardised annual 
financial statements of these firms which were obtained from the McGregorBFA database. The total number of 
observations for the period is1,839. To eliminate outlier observations and the most extremely misrecorded data, all 
variables were winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Following Baker and Wurgler (2002:12), 𝐸𝐹𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵'(C, 𝐸𝐸𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵', 𝐷𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵', and 𝐸𝐹𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵'()values greater than 10 were dropped and negative 𝐸𝐹𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵'(C, 𝐸𝐸𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵', 𝐷𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵', and 𝐸𝐹𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵'()values were reset to zero. 
 
Market-to-debt ratio (MDR): the total interest-bearing debt (short-term plus long-term) scaled up by the sum of 
the total debt and the firm market capitalisation.  
 
Book-to-debt ratio (BDR): the total interest-bearing debt (short-term plus long-term) scaled up by the total assets.  
 
Firm profitability (Profitability): earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) as a 
fraction of total assets (TA).  
 
Firm size (Size): the natural logarithm of total assets.  
 
Asset tangibility (Tangibility): the fixed assets scaled up by the total assets.  
 
Un-weighted market-to-book ratio (MTB): the sum of the market value of equity, book value of preference shares 
and the book value of total debt less deferred taxes; this is scaled up by the total assets.  
 
Weighted market-to-book ratio: are the market timing measures which are defined as follows:   
 𝐸𝐹𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵'(C ≡ -./0'1.-2/0'12345265'7+89+ ×𝑀𝐵8;   𝐸𝐸𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵' ≡ +,( -. -2345265'7+89+ ×𝑀𝐵8; 
 𝐷𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵' ≡ +,( 0'1.0'12345265'7+89+ ×𝑀𝐵8 and 𝐸𝐹𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵'() ≡ +,( -./0'1.-2/0'12345265'7+89+ ×𝑀𝐵8 
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Where 𝑒 and 𝑙𝑡𝑑 denote net equity and long-term debt issuances respectively; 𝑀𝑇𝐵 is the un-weighted market-to-
book ratio, suffice 𝑠	  represents a specific year issuances and suffice 𝑟 represents issuances for the total period. 
Equity and debt issuances are respectively defined as a change (increase) in the book value of share capital and 
change (increase) in the book value of debt.  
 
With mean MDR and BDR ratios of 0.3784 and 0.3193 respectively, the financial services firms have higher 
leverage than their non-financial counterparts listed on the JSE. According to Moyo (2014), the JSE-listed non-
financial firms have a mean a MDR ratio of 0.1716 and a BDR ratio 0.1909.  On average, the JSE-listed financial 
services firms are less profitable, hold less tangible assets and have a lower growth rate when compared to the JSE-
listed non-financial firms. The non-financial firms have an average profitability, asset tangibility and growth rate of 
0.2000, 0.3240 and 1.3374 respectively. The mean size of the financial services firms is 16.1284 which is higher 
than 14.3066 of non-financial firms. This means that on average the financial services firms are larger than non-
financial firms. In summary, the JSE-listed financial services firms use more debt than non-financial firms. The 
firms are also larger, less profitable, have lower growth rates and hold less tangible assets when compared to non-
financial firms.       
 
4.2 Empirical Results  
 
The results for model 1 are contained in Table 2. The MDR ratio is positively correlated to the external finance-
weighted average market-to-book ratio (𝐸𝐹𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵'()). The BDR ratio is however negatively correlated to 𝐸𝐹𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵'(). The correlations are however insignificant in both cases thus rejecting the market timing hypothesis. 
The results validate the dynamic trade-off theory. Moyo (2014) found similar results for JSE-listed non-financial 
firms. This means that the JSE-listed firms do not time the market when making equity issuance decisions.    
 
4.3 Leverage and Firm-Specific Factors  
 
Profitability: In both the MDR and the BDR regressions, profitability is positively correlated to leverage. The 
correlation is however insignificant making profitability a weak predictor of firm leverage. The results mean 
leverage increases with firm profitability. This result is inconsistent with the pecking order theory but consistent 
with the trade-off theory.  
 
Size: Size is positively related to both the MDR and the BDR. It has a higher power to explain the MDR ratio than 
the BDR ratio. In the financial services firms, leverage increases with firms. Large firms use more debt while 
smaller firms rely on equity finance.   
 
Tangibility: The results confirm a positive correlation between tangibility and MDR and BDR. In some cases it is a 
significant predictor of the MDR.  The leverage of the financial services firms increase with the firm’s stock of 
tangible assets.   
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Table 2.  The Effects of Historical Weighted Market-to-Book in MDR and BDR Capital Structure Regressions 
 Variables Profitability Size Tangibility MTB 𝑬𝑭𝑾𝑨𝑴𝑩𝒕𝑩𝑫 
Market Leverage (MDR)      
2003-2007 0.2900 0.0263** -0.0640 0.0408 0.1129 (0.92) (3.26) (-0.10) (0.84) (0.80) 
2004-2008 0.4308 0.0316*** 0.5520 0.0469 0.1646 (1.49) (3.89) (0.80) (1.05) (1.09) 
2005-2009 0.3032 0.0833*** 2.6758*** 0.1192** -0.0240 (1.48) (8.98) (3.86) (2.98) (-0.19) 
2006-2010 0.2717  0.0224** 1.0745* 0.0561 0.1900 (1.15) (3.01) (2.05) (1.43) (0.99) 
2007-2011 0.2676  0.0054 0.5024 0.0458 0.2062 (1.01) (0.75) (1.09) (1.17) (0.99) 
2008-2012 0.0296  0.0133* 1.1681** 0.0938* -0.0452 (0.11) (1.99) (3.02) (2.20) (-0.19) 
Full Sample -0.0009 0.0704*** 1.6520** 0.1517*** 0.0430 (-0.00) (5.55) (2.65) (3.36) (0.37) 
Book Leverage ( BDR )      
2003-2007 0.4962* 0.0068 -0.5798 -0.0262 0.0308 (2.16) (1.14) (-1.21) (-1.21) (0.30) 
2004-2008 0.2128 0.1364 0.3219 0.0244 -0.0274 (0.84) (1.86) (0.53) (0.63) (-0.21) 
2005-2009 0.5436* 0.0173* 0.3050 0.0187 -0.0059 (2.23) (2.24) (0.50) (0.46) (-0.04) 
2006-2010 0.2528 0.0186* 0.9661 0.0642 -0.0297 (0.90) (2.13) (1.55) (1.36) (-0.13) 
2007-2011 0.1486  0.0405*** 1.0425* -0.0265 -0.1514 (0.63) (5.78) (2.55) (-0.76) (-0.87) 
2008-2012 0.0840 0.0304*** 1.6527** 0.1434* -0.4490 (0.23) (3.53) (3.24) (2.50) (-1.41) 
Full Sample -0.2907 0.0487*** -0.2913 0.0464 0.1057 (-1.67) (7.05) (-0.94) (1.67) (1.03) 
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(Table 2 Continued) 
 
Speed of Adjustment Fit Statistics 
Lev_t-1 
Coefficient SOA (λ ) 
Half-life 
(years) Obs Wald Chi2 Prob> Chi2 
Market Leverage (MDR)       
2003-2007 0.7776*** 22.24% 2.76 144 244.31 0.0000 (11.63) 
2004-2008 0 .7746*** 22.54% 2.71 145 287.00 0.0000 (12.07) 
2005-2009 0.2818*** 71.82% 0.55 145 310.34 0.00000 (3.73) 
2006-2010 0.8783*** 12.17% 5.34 145 483.03 0.0000 (16.05) 
2007-2011 0.9675*** 3.25% 20.98 145 578.40 0.000 (18.96) 
2008-2012 0.9651*** 3.49% 19.51 116 681.08 0.0000 (20.83) 
Full Sample 0 .4320*** 56.80% 0.83 260 189.28 0.0000 (6.44) 
Book Leverage ( BDR )       
2003-2007 0.8866*** 11.34% 5.76 144 403.44 0.0000 (16.80) 
2004-2008 0.8573*** 14.27% 4.50 145 310.71 0.0000 (14.67) 
2005-2009 0.8300*** 17.00% 3.72 145 315.15 0.0000 (14.62) 
2006-2010 0.8523*** 14.77% 4.34 145 284.82 0.0000 (14.20) 
2007-2011 -0.0357 103.57% - 145 67.21 0.0000 (-0.47) 
2008-2012 0.8434*** 15.66% 4.07 116 347.66 0.0000 (15.38) 
Full Sample 0.2869*** 71.31% 0.56 260 259.45 0.0000 (4.29) 
 
Firm growth rate: The growth rate is positively correlated to both MDR and BDR. The correlations are however 
insignificant. This result means that high growth financial services firms rely on debt finance whilst low growth 
firms use more equity.    
 
Regression results for the partial adjustment model: 
 𝐿𝑒𝑣F,'/+ = 𝛼 + 1 − 𝜆 𝐿𝑒𝑣F,' + 𝜆𝛽+𝑋' + 𝜆𝛽J𝐸𝐹𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵'() + 𝑐F,' + 𝜀F,'/+ 
 
Where λ is the SOA towards the target leverage,  𝑐F,M is the time-invariant unobserved variable (firm fixed effect) 
and 𝜀F,M/+ is an error term. The variables determining the firm’s long-run target leverage and the SOA are: 
profitability, size, tangibility and un-weighted market-to-book, and these are defined in Table 1. 𝐸𝐹𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵'()is the 
Bruinshoofd and De Haan (2012) market timing measure which is also defined in Table 1. T-statistics are reported 
in parentheses. The markings ***, ** and * on coefficient estimates denote significant differences from zero at the 
levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. The implied half-life is calculated as: ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑓 − 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒 =log	  (0.5) log	  (1 − 𝜆).  Model specifications are shown under fit statistics.   
 
The correlation results on profitability, firm size and asset tangibility are all consistent with the predictions of the 
trade-off theory. The positive correlation between leverage and firm growth rate however rejects the trade-off 
hypothesis. According Barclay and Smith (2005), profitable firms tend to be large, mature, have limited growth 
options and have a high stock of assets in place (tangibles). Jensen (1986) contends that these firms have a higher 
propensity to generate excess free cash flows which can increase the firm’s agency costs of overinvestment. The 
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firms also face increased tax bills which derive from their high profits and low non-debt tax shields in the form of 
capital allowances. On the other hand, the high profitability coupled with high stocks of assets in place increases the 
firm’s credit ratings, thus lowering the firm’s cost of borrowing (Kisgen, 2007).  The trade-off theory contends that 
using more debt in large, mature and profitable firms effectively reduces their taxes and agency costs of 
overinvestment thus increasing shareholder value (Harvey, Lins & Roper (2004); Jensen (1986:323); and Stulz 
(1990) and Bessler et al (2011).  The increased debt interest tax shield adds to the value of the firm. Thus large, 
mature and profitable have strong incentive to exploit the tax advantage of the debt interest tax shield (Dang, 2013). 
In summary, the JSE-listed financial services firms seem to follow the trade-off theory in raising capital. The 
correlation son all the four factors reject the pecking order hypothesis.  
 
4.4 Target SOA  
 
In all cases, the firms have a positive and significant SOA towards the target leverage. The speed increases with time 
and sample size indicating that the full sample SOA is the least biased. The true SOA for the sample is 56.80% 
(half-life of 0.83 years) for the MDR and 71.31% (half-life of 0.56 years) for the BDR. This means that, in the case 
of the MDR, 56.80% of the target deviation spread is covered in one year and it takes 0.83 years to cover 50% of the 
target deviation spread. These results validate the dynamic trade-off theory and both reject the market timing and 
pecking order theories. The target SOA for the financial services firms is however faster than that of the JSE-listed 
non-financial firms. Using the same random effects Tobit estimator, Moyo et al (2013) documented a target SOA of 
42.44% (MDR) and 57.64% (BDR) for JSE-listed manufacturing, mining and retail firms. Ramjee and Gwatidzo 
(2012) found that the SOA towards the target leverage was 65.50% (on total debt ratio) for JSE-listed non-financial 
services firms. The higher SOA implies that the financial firms are more active in adjusting their capital structures 
towards the optimal levels. Interestingly, the SOA results are also consistent with the buffer capital and optimal bank 
capital structure hypotheses which, according to Berger et al (2008), posits that banks actively reliance their capital 
structures to the optimal.  
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Table 3.  Dynamic Capital Structure Regressions Using Only Firm-Specific Variables 
 Variables Profitability Size Tangibility MTB 
Market Leverage (MDR) 	   	   	   	  
2003-2007 0.2635 (0.84) 
0.0273*** 
(3.44) 
0.0318 
(0.05) 
0.0482 
(1.02) 
2004-2008 0.3564 (1.07) 
0.0612** 
(3.20) 
0.8858 
(0.86) 
0.1093 
(1.89) 
2005-2009 0.3032 (1.48) 
0.0831*** 
(9.00) 
2.6519*** 
(3.88) 
0.1183** 
(2.99) 
2006-2010 0.2874 (1.22) 
0.0231** 
(3.10) 
1.1695* 
(2.26) 
0.0640 
(1.66) 
2007-2011 0.2838 (1.07) 
0.0066 
(0.91) 
0.5809 
(1.28) 
0.0556 
(1.45) 
2008-2012 0.0291 (0.11) 
0.0131* 
(1.99) 
1.1537** 
(3.05) 
0.0914* 
(2.25) 
Full Sample -0.0036 (-0.01)) 
0.0700*** 
(5.29) 
1.6346* 
(2.56) 
0.1523*** 
(3.36) 
Book Leverage ( BDR ) 	   	   	   	  
2003-2007 0.4921* (2.17) 
0.0070 
(1.18) 
-0.5566 
(-1.19) 
-0.0251 
(-0.75) 
2004-2008 0.2183 (0.86) 
0.0135 
(1.85) 
0.3073 
(0.51) 
0.0230 
(0.60) 
2005-2009 0.5437* (2.23) 
0.0173* 
(2.24) 
0.3015 
(0.50) 
0.0185 
(0.46) 
2006-2010 0.2505 (0.90) 
0.0184* 
(2.13) 
0.9514 
(1.55) 
0.0630 
(1.37) 
2007-2011 0.1596 (0.58) 
0.0387*** 
(4.61) 
0.9553* 
(2.29) 
-0.0318 
(-0.92) 
2008-2012 0.0804 (0.22) 
0.0282*** 
(3.30) 
1.5157** 
(3.01) 
0.1226* 
(2.19) 
Full Sample 0.3065 (1.78) 
0.0293*** 
(5.55) 
0.2768 
(0.86) 
0.0028 
(0.10) 
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(Table 3 Continued) 
 
Speed of Adjustment Fit Statistics 
Lev_t-1 
Coefficient SOA (λ ) 
Half-life 
(years) Obs Wald Chi2 
Prob> 
Chi2 
Market Leverage (MDR) 	   	   	   	   	   	  
2003-2007 0.7788*** (11.74) 22.12% 2.77 145 249.42 0.0000 
2004-2008 0.4607** (2.85) 53.93% 0.89 145 74.21 0.0000 
2005-2009 0.2839*** (3.79) 71.61% 0.55 145 308.21 0.00000 
2006-2010 0.8802*** (16.06) 11.98% 5.43 145 480.27 0.0000 
2007-2011 0.9709*** (19.00) 2.91% 23.47 145 573.92 0.0000 
2008-2012 0.9643*** (20.90) 3.57% 19.07 116 681.04 0.0000 
Full Sample 0.4320*** (6.40) 56.80% 0.83 261 169.74 0.0000 
Book Leverage ( BDR ) 	   	   	   	   	   	  
2003-2007 0.8846*** (16.92) 11.54% 5.65 145 411.97 0.0000 
2004-2008 0.8573*** (14.66) 14.27% 4.50 145 310.25 0.0000 
2005-2009 0.8300*** (14.63) 17.00% 3.72 145 315.08 0.0000 
2006-2010 0.8524*** (14.20) 14.76% 4.34 145 284.24 0.0000 
2007-2011 -0.0264 (-0.33) 106.24% - 145 49.23 0.0000 
2008-2012 0.8340*** (15.18) 16.60% 3.82 116 340.49 0.0000 
Full Sample 0.5122*** (9.69) 48.78% 1.04 261 345.82 0.0000 
 
4.5 Capital Structure Regressions Results 
 
The results of the variables follow those of test 1 described above. Profitability, firm size, asset tangibility and 
growth rate are all positively correlated to both the MDR and the BDR. Firm size is a significant determinant of 
leverage for the full sample. The SOA also follows the same pattern exhibited in test 1.The true SOA for the sample 
is 56.80% (half-life of 0.83 years) for the MDR and 48.78% (half-life of 1.04 years) for the BDR. The market timing 
measure has a negligible impact on MDR regressions but its exclusion reduces the BDR SOA.  
 
Regression results for the partial adjustment model: 
 𝐿𝑒𝑣F,'/+ = 𝛼 + 1 − 𝜆 𝐿𝑒𝑣F,' + 𝜆𝛽+𝑋' + 𝑐F,' + 𝜀F,'/+ 
 
Where λ is the SOA towards the target leverage, 𝑐F,M is the time-invariant unobserved variable (firm fixed effect) and 𝜀F,M/+ is an error term. The variables determining the firm’s long-run target leverage and the SOA are: profitability, 
size, tangibility and un-weighted market-to-book, and these are defined in Table 1. T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. The markings ***, ** and * on coefficient estimates denote significant differences from zero at the 
levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. The implied half-life is calculated as: ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑓 − 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒 =log	  (0.5) log	  (1 − 𝜆).  Model specifications are shown under fit statistics.  
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4.6 Robustness Test  
 
The study used two further tests to check for the robustness of the rejection of the market timing theory. The first 
robustness test involved using the market timing measure suggested by Baker and Wurgler (2002), the 𝐸𝐹𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵'(C. Following Bruinshoofd and De Haan (2012), this measure was computed using only long-term debt. 
Thus regression model 1 was modified to:  
 𝐿𝑒𝑣F,'/+ = 𝛼 + 1 − 𝜆 𝐿𝑒𝑣F,' + 𝜆 𝑿F,'𝛾+ + 𝜆𝛾J𝐸𝐹𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵'(C + 𝑐F,' + 𝜀F,'/+	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   (10) 
 
This is regression model 3. To validate the market timing theory, 𝐸𝐹𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵'(C must be significantly correlated to 
leverage, otherwise the market timing theory is rejected. 
 
The second robustness test was suggested by Bruinshoofd and De Haan (2012) and uses two alternative market 
timing measures namely the external equity-weighted average market-to-book ratio (EEWAMB) and the long-term 
debt-weighted average market-to-book ratio (DWAMB), defined as follows:  
 𝐸𝐸𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵' = +,( -. -2345265'7+89+ ×𝑀𝐵8	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   (11) 
 𝐷𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵' = +,( 0'1.0'12345265'7+89+ ×𝑀𝐵8	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   (12) 
 
These measures separately test for the market timing hypothesis of both equity and debt issuance decisions. The 𝐷𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵' uses only long-term debt issuance, as this is more likely to represent market timing than short-term debt 
does. The regression model 1 partial adjustment model is therefore restated as:  
 𝐿𝑒𝑣F,'/+ = 𝛼 + 1 − 𝜆 𝐿𝑒𝑣F,' + 𝜆 𝑿F,'𝛾+ + 𝜆𝛾J𝐸𝐸𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵' + 𝜆𝛾O𝐷𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵' + 𝑐F,' +𝜀F,'/+	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   (13) 
 
This is regression model 4. A significant negative correlation between leverage and 𝐸𝐸𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵 confirms the validity 
of the market timing theory, whilst a positive correlation validates the static trade-off theory. A significant positive 
correlation between 𝐷𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵 and leverage validates the market timing theory. The results of both tests are 
contained in tables 4 and 5 respectively. 
 
Regression results for the partial adjustment model: 
 𝐿𝑒𝑣F,'/+ = 𝛼 + 1 − 𝜆 𝐿𝑒𝑣F,' + 𝜆𝛽+𝑋' + 𝜆𝛽J𝐸𝐹𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵'(C + 𝑐F,' + 𝜀F,'/+ 
 
Where λ is the SOA towards the target leverage, 𝑐F,M is the time-invariant unobserved variable (firm fixed effect) 
and 𝜀F,M/+ is an error term. The variables determining the firm’s long-run target leverage and the SOA are: 
profitability, size, tangibility and un-weighted market-to-book, and these are defined in Table 1. 𝐸𝐹𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵'(Cis the modified Baker and Wurgler (2002) market timing measure which is also defined in Table 
1. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The markings ***, ** and * on coefficient estimates denote 
significant differences from zero at the levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. The implied half-life is 
calculated as: ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑓 − 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒 = log	  (0.5) log	  (1 − 𝜆).  Model specifications are shown under fit statistics. 
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Table 4. Robustness Test: The Impact of the Modified Baker and Wurgler (2002)  
Market Timing Measure on Capital Structure Regressions 
 Variables Profitability Size Tangibility MTB 𝑬𝑭𝑾𝑨𝑴𝑩𝒕𝑩𝑾 
Market Leverage (MDR) 	   	   	   	   	  
2003-2007 0.2776 (0.89) 
0.0270*** 
(3.41) 
-0.0297 
(-0.05) 
0.0321 
(0.62) 
0.1897 
(0.76) 
2004-2008 0.3399 (1.01) 
0.0611** 
(3.10) 
0.8523 
(0.82) 
0.1000 
1.66) 
0.1324 
(0.65) 
2005-2009 0.1375 (0.61) 
0.0862*** 
(8.06) 
1.2100 
(1.63) 
0.1756*** 
(3.54) 
0.0282 
(0.19) 
2006-2010 0.2548 (1.08) 
0.0231** 
(3.13) 
1.0972* 
(2.13) 
0.0446 
(1.10) 
0.3611 
(1.37) 
2007-2011 0.2630 (0.99) 
0.0064 
(0.90) 
0.5467 
(1.20) 
0.0379 
(0.90) 
0.2486 
(1.00) 
2008-2012 0.0400 (0.15) 
0.0132 
(1.75) 
1.1881** 
(2.98) 
0.1079* 
(2.27) 
-0.2655 
(-0.82) 
Full Sample -0.2271 (-0.68) 
0.0464*** 
(6.76) 
0.6714 
(1.76) 
0.1562*** 
(3.43) 
0.1018 
(0.54) 
Book Leverage ( BDR ) 	   	   	   	   	  
2003-2007 0.5064* (2.23) 
0.0068 
(1.15) 
-0.6118 
(-1.30) 
-0.0388 
(-1.06) 
0.1649 
(0.92) 
2004-2008 0.2174 (0.86) 
0.0135 
(1.84) 
0.3088 
(0.51) 
0.0238 
(0.58) 
-0.0098 
(-0.05) 
2005-2009 0.5426* (2.22) 
0.0172* 
(2.22) 
0.3106 
(0.51) 
0.0208 
(0.49) 
-0.0286 
(-0.16) 
2006-2010 0.2553 (0.91) 
0.0184* 
(2.13) 
0.9623 
(1.56) 
0.0659 
(1.35) 
-0.0560 
(-0.18) 
2007-2011 0.1874 (0.68) 
0.0382*** 
(4.56) 
0.9718* 
(2.30) 
-0.02336 
(-0.65) 
-0.1395 
(-0.24) 
2008-2012 0.1153 (0.32) 
0.0282*** 
(3.37) 
1.6173** 
(3.26) 
0.1724** 
(2.90) 
-0.9294* 
(-2.23) 
Full Sample 0.0093 (0.05) 
0.0459*** 
(6.34) 
0.4725 
(1.21) 
0.0978** 
(2.86) 
0.0104 
(0.07) 
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(Table 4 Continued) 
 
Speed of Adjustment Fit Statistics 
Lev_t+1 
Coefficient SOA (λ ) 
Half-life 
(years) Obs Wald Chi2 Prob> Chi2 
Market Leverage (MDR) 	   	   	   	   	   	  
2003-2007 0.7765*** (11.71) 22.35% 2.74 145 250.64 0.0000 
2004-2008 0.4606** (2.76) 53.94% 0.89 145 74.66 0.0000 
2005-2009 0.3017*** (3.98) 69.83% 0.58 145 338.68 0.0000 
2006-2010 0.8781*** (16.11) 12.19% 5.33 145 487.04 0.0000 
2007-2011 0.9658*** (18.89) 3.42% 19.92 145 579.16 0.0000 
2008-2012 0.9698*** (17.24) 3.02% 22.60 116 572.71 0.0000 
Full Sample 0.3790*** (4.21) 62.10% 0.71 261 159.21 0.0000 
Book Leverage ( BDR ) 	   	   	   	   	   	  
2003-2007 0.8827*** (9.72) 11.73% 5.56 145 414.18 0.0000 
2004-2008 0.8574*** (14.66) 14.26% 4.51 145 310.33 0.0000 
2005-2009 0.8305*** (14.62) 16.95% 3.73 145 315.33 0.0000 
2006-2010 0.8529*** (14.19) 14.71% 4.36 145 284.44 0.0000 
2007-2011 -0.1974 (-0.24) 119.74% - 145 47.38 0.0000 
2008-2012 0.8603*** (15.61) 13.97% 4.61 116 358.08 0.0000 
Full Sample 0.3375*** (4.80) 66.25% 0.64 261 233.81 0.0000 
 
Regression results for the partial adjustment model: 
 𝐿𝑒𝑣F,'/+ = 𝛼 + 1 − 𝜆 𝐿𝑒𝑣F,' + 𝜆𝛽+𝑋' + 𝜆𝛽J𝐸𝐸𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵' + 𝜆𝛽O𝐷𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵' + 𝑐F,' + 𝜀F,'/+ 
 
Where λ is the SOA towards the target leverage, 𝑐F,M is the time-invariant unobserved variable (firm fixed effect) and 𝜀F,M/+ is an error term. The variables determining the firm’s long-run target leverage and the SOA are: profitability, 
size, tangibility and un-weighted market-to-book, and these are defined in Table 1. 𝐸𝐸𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵'and𝐷𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵' are 
the Bruinshoofd and De Haan (2012) equity and debt timing measures respectively; these are defined in Table 1. T-
statistics are reported in parentheses. The markings ***, ** and * on coefficient estimates denote significant 
differences from zero at the levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. The implied half-life is calculated as: ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑓 −𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒 = log	  (0.5) log	  (1 − 𝜆).  Model specifications are shown under fit statistics.   
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Table 5. Robustness Test: The Impact of Separate Equity and Debt Market Timing Measures on Capital Structure Regressions 
 
Variables 
Profitability Size Tangibility MTB 𝑬𝑬𝑾𝑨𝑴𝑩𝒕 𝑫𝑾𝑨𝑴𝑩𝒕 
Market Leverage (MDR)	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
2003-2007 0.2831 (0.91) 
0.0252** 
(3.23) 
-0.2881 
(-0.45) 
0.0258 
(0.55) 
0.2067 
(1.12) 
0.1056 
(1.51) 
2004-2008 0.3308 (1.15) 
0.0316*** 
(3.99) 
0.2028 
(0.30) 
0.0455 
(1.04) 
0.2081 
(1.08) 
0.1283 
(1.90) 
2005-2009 0.3040 (1.42) 
0.0814*** 
(8.00) 
2.4887** 
(3.00) 
0.1111* 
(2.44) 
0.0215 
(0.13) 
-0.0051 
(-0.08) 
2006-2010 0.2307 (1.00) 
0.0248*** 
(3.35) 
0.9241 
(1.77) 
0.0580 
(1.53) 
0.2257 
(1.17) 
0.1757 
(1.86) 
2007-2011 0.2373 (0.92) 
0.0058 
(0.81) 
0.2542 
(0.56) 
0.0380 
(1.03) 
0.3462 
(1.65) 
0.2747* 
(2.18) 
2008-2012 0.0314 (0.12) 
0.0126 
(1.91) 
0.9006* 
(2.40) 
0.0703 
(1.45) 
0.3936 
(1.45) 
0.3159* 
(1.15) 
Full Sample 0.05534 (0.14) 
0.05714* 
(2.43) 
1.1333 
(1.78) 
0.1153 
(1.61) 
0.0921 
(0.60) 
0.1360* 
(2.15) 
Book Leverage ( BDR )	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
2003-2007 0.5537* (2.43) 
0.0065 
(1.11) 
-0.7148 
(-1.52) 
-0.0376 
(-1.13) 
0.0886 
(0.66) 
0.0142 
(0.28) 
2004-2008 0.2669 (1.04) 
0.0127 
(1.75) 
0.1276 
(0.21) 
0.0117 
(0.30) 
-0.0251 
(-0.14) 
0.0329 
(0.54) 
2005-2009 0.5222* (2.12) 
0.0165* 
(2.15) 
0.0902 
(0.15) 
0.0134 
(0.33) 
0.1143 
(0.62) 
0.0383 
(0.54) 
2006-2010 0.1957 (0.71) 
0.0192* 
(2.22) 
0.6619 
(1.07) 
0.0607 
(1.34) 
0.2584 
(1.12) 
0.2134 
(1.90) 
2007-2011 0.2755 (0.86) 
0.0175* 
(2.06) 
0.4111 
(0.73) 
0.0586 
(1.24) 
0.3722 
(1.42) 
0.4260** 
(2.72) 
2008-2012 0.0447 (0.12) 
0.0285*** 
(3.33) 
1.2936* 
(2.56) 
0.1121* 
(2.03) 
0.1018 
(0.28) 
0.4463* 
(2.29) 
Full Sample -0.2798 (-1.51) 
0.0448*** 
(7.24) 
-0.3170 
(-0.97) 
0.0373 
(1.33) 
0.1361 
(1.12) 
0.1043* 
(2.04) 
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(Table 5 Continued) 
 
Speed of Adjustment Fit Statistics 
Lev_t+1 
Coefficient SOA (λ ) 
Half-life 
(years) Obs Wald Chi2 Prob> Chi2 
Market Leverage (MDR)	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
2003-2007 0.7398*** (9.70) 26.02% 2.30 140 245.56 0.0000 
2004-2008 0.7338*** (11.41) 26.62% 2.24 140 283.30 0.0000 
2005-2009 0.2842*** (3.61) 71.58% 0.55 140 286.65 0.0000 
2006-2010 0.8476*** (15.56) 15.24% 4.19 140 476.30 0.0000 
2007-2011 0.9394*** (18.48) 6.06% 11.09 140 585.14 0.0000 
2008-2012 0.9334*** (20.25) 6.66% 10.06 112 699.10 0.0000 
Full Sample 0.4556*** (6.21) 54.44% 0.88 252 85.19 0.0000 
Book Leverage ( BDR )	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
2003-2007 0.8574*** (16.28) 14.26% 4.51 140 400.98 0.0000 
2004-2008 0.8363*** (14.10) 16.37% 3.88 140 295.84 0.0000 
2005-2009 0.8103*** (14.17) 18.97% 3.30 140 300.95 0.0000 
2006-2010 0.8358*** (14.15) 16.42% 3.86 140 282.30 0.0000 
2007-2011 0.8259*** (14.96) 17.41% 3.62 140 319.60 0.0000 
2008-2012 0.8065*** (14.88) 19.35% 3.22 112 341.54 0.0000 
Full Sample 0.3022*** (4.33) 69.78% 0.58 252 381.42 0.0000 
 
Robustness Tests 1 and 2: The test results of both models are consistent with the main empirical results. Both MDR 
and BDR decrease with an increase in profitability, firm size, asset tangibility and from growth rate.  Size is 
significant determinant of both MDR and BDR.  In test 1, the market timing measure, 𝐸𝐹𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵'(C is positively the 
MDR negatively correlated to the BDR. The correlations are however insignificant.  The SOA of adjustment is 
within the range of test 1 results. The sample SOA is 62.10% (half-life of 0.71 years) for the MDR and 66.25% 
(0.64 years) for the BDR. In test 2, the market timing measures 𝐸𝐸𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵' and 𝐷𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐵' are all positively 
correlated to both the MDR and the BDR. The sample SOA is 54.44% (half-life of 0.88 years) for the MDR and 
69.78% (0.58 years) for the BDR.  These results reject the market timing hypothesis in the case of JSE-listed 
financial services firms. The correlations on profitability, size and tangibility and the positive SOA validate the 
dynamic trade-off theory.      
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
This study was aimed at testing the suitability of the three leading capital structure theories in explaining the 
observed capital structures of financial services firms listed on the JSE.  The theories tested were the dynamic trade-
off, pecking order and market timing theories. The results of the study can be summarised as follows. Both the 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) and the modified Bruinshoofd and De Haan (2012) market timing measures are positively 
correlated to the MDR and the BDR. The correlations are however insignificant in all cases. Firm profitability, size, 
tangibility and growth rate all positively correlated to the MDR and the BDR. The firms have a positive SOA 
towards the optimal capital structure. In the MDR regressions, the market timing measures have an insignificant 
impact on the firms’ SOA towards the target leverage. The measures however increase the SOA towards the target 
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leverage in the BDR regressions. The results are robust. These results reject both the pecking order and market 
timing hypotheses. Stock performance and share returns thus play no role in the security issuance decisions of these 
firms. Except for the correlation between leverage and firm growth, the results strongly validate the dynamic trade-
off theory. The JSE-listed financial services firms have target optimal capital structures which they actively adjusts 
towards. The firms actively rebalance their capital structures towards the pre-defined optimal. These findings are 
also consistent with the buffer capital and optimal bank capital structure hypotheses.  
 
The size of the sample was the main limitation of this study. There were only twenty-nine listed financial services 
firms with complete data for eight or more consecutive years during the period 2003 to 2012. The study can be 
repeated using the Common Equity Tier 1 capital (CET 1 capital) ratio instead of the MDR and the BDR.  
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